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COREY KELLY, a/k/a "Tre," Appellant at No. 00-2705; 
ROBERT DAVID, Appellant at No. 00-2849; and 
BERNARD WINSTON, Appellant at No. 00-3688. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Nos. 99-cr-00672-1, 99-cr-00672-7 & 99-cr-00672-8) 
District Judge: Hon. Jerome B. Simandle 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2001 
 
Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and ALDISERT, 
Circuit Judges. 
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We affirmed the judgment of the district court in all 
respects in a Not for Publication Memorandum Opinion 
filed October 26, 2001. We rejected, inter alia, Appellants' 
contention that in light of the holding in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841 are facially unconstitutional and thus conspiracy 
convictions thereunder are invalid. Thereafter, the United 
States Attorney filed a motion asking that the portion of our 
opinion addressing this issue be published, noting that the 
constitutionality of the statute has been challenged in a 
number of pending cases in this court and in various 
district courts in our judicial circuit.1  We have decided to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See e.g., Wasang Thomas Mock v. Bernie D. Ellis, No. 01-2013; United 
States v. Richard Marshall, No. 01-1825; United States v. Joseph Criniti, 
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accommodate this request and set forth this brief statement 
of our reasons for rejecting Appellants' argument. 
 
Because this is a question of law only, we need not set 
forth the facts other than to state that in these consolidated 
cases, Corey Kelly, Robert David and Bernard Winston 
appeal their respective judgments of conviction and 
sentencing in drug cases. Count one of the indictment 
charged Kelly, David, Winston and three other co- 
defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
the intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine 
base. Count four charged Kelly and another with the 
substantive offense of distribution, and possession with 
intent to distribute 4.1 grams of cocaine base. Count five 
charged Kelly, David, Winston and others with a drug 
trafficking count involving 23.5 grams. The jury convicted 
Kelly on the conspiracy count and the substantive counts 
four and five. The jurors also convicted both David and 
Winston on the conspiracy count, but acquitted them on 
count five. 
 
Section 841(a), captioned "Unlawful acts," provides: 
 
       Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be 
       unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-- 
       (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess 
       with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
       controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or 
       dispense, or possess with intent to distribute, or 
       dispense, a counterfeit substance. 
 
21 U.S.C. S 841(a) (1994). 
 
Section 841(b), captioned "Penalties," states that "any 
person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
No. 01-1673; United States v. Eugene Williams , No. 01-1479. The issue 
has also been raised in criminal and civil proceedings in our district 
courts. See e.g., Gary Nero v. United States, D.N.J. Civ. No. 01-1927; 
United States v. Wayman Brown, D.N.J. Crim. No. 01-477; United States 
v. Louis Santaguida et al., D.N.J. Crim. No. 00-247; Anderson Delgado v. 
Olson, D.N.J. Civ. No. 01-2538; Glendon Henry v. United States, D. Del. 
No. 00-43, Civ. No. 01-619; Jorge Luis Orendain v. Warden, FCI McKean, 
W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 01-310E; United States v. Hamlin, W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 
98-43; United States v. Hurley, W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 88-219. 
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sentenced as follows . . ." It then proceeds to lay out the 
minimum and maximum penalties for possession of various 
types and quantities of drugs, with adjustments depending 
on whether the defendant has prior drug-related 
convictions or whether the activities caused death or 
serious injury. 
 
In a recent en banc decision, this court made the 
following determination in an Apprendi context: 
 
       We indicated in United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 
       (3d Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3763 
       (U.S. 2001), and we hold here, that an Apprendi  
       violation only occurs if the drug quantity is not found 
       by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
       defendant's sentence under S 841 exceeds 20 years. 
 
United States v. Vazquez, ___ F.3d ___, ___; 2001 WL 
1188250 *3 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 
In light of the Apprendi holding, Appellants contend that 
21 U.S.C. S 841 is facially unconstitutional, because 
sentencing factors must now be treated as elements of the 
offense and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Kelly Brief 
at 31. Because none of the Appellants challenged the facial 
constitutionality of S 841(a) in the district court, this 
contention is reviewed for plain error. 
 
We conclude that Appellants may not prevail, because 
the district court committed no "clear" or"obvious" error by 
declining to declare all convictions under S 841(a) to be 
facially unconstitutional. Every appellate court that has 
considered the issue has upheld its constitutionality.2 One 
court that has addressed facial constitutional challenges to 
S 841 under Apprendi has concluded that such claims are 
not only meritless, but "confused." United States v. Brough, 
243 F.3d 1078, 1079 (7th Cir. 2001).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A split panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
otherwise, but its opinion has been vacated. United States v. Buckland, 
259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion vacated and en banc 
consideration granted, 2001 WL 1091167 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001). 
 
3. At least five other courts of appeals have considered the issue and 
have essentially agreed with the Brough formulation. See United States v. 
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We agree with and adopt the reasoning of Brough:  
 
       Apprendi . . . [does] not establish that anything in 
       S 841 is unconstitutional or require[s] its severance. If 
       Congress had specified that only judges may make the 
       findings required by S 841(b), or that these findings 
       must be made by a preponderance of the evidence, 
       then S 841 would create a constitutional problem. But 
       the statute does not say who makes the findings or 
       which party bears what burden of persuasion. Instead 
       the law attaches effects to facts, leaving it to the 
       judiciary to sort out who determines the facts, under 
       what burden. It makes no constitutional difference 
       whether a single subsection covers both elements and 
       penalties, whether these are divided across multiple 
       subsections (as S 841 does), or even whether they are 
       scattered across multiple statutes (see 18 U.S.C. 
       SS 924(a), 1963). Apprendi holds that the due process 
       clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments make 
       the jury the right decision maker (unless the defendant 
       elects a bench trial), and the reasonable-doubt 
       standard the proper burden, when a fact raises the 
       maximum lawful punishment. How statutes are 
       drafted, or implemented, to fulfil that requirement is a 
       subject to which the Constitution does not speak. 
 
Brough, 243 F.3d at 1079. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1311 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding a facial 
challenge to drug statutes to be "without merit"); United States v. 
Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 2000) ("We see nothing in the 
Supreme Court decision in Apprendi which would permit us to conclude 
that 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a) and (b), 846, and 860(a) are unconstitutional on 
their face"); United States v. Meyst, 2001 WL 1126642 at *1 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 25, 2001) ("On appeal, Meyst argues that the rule announced in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), renders 21 U.S.C.A S 841 
. . . unconstitutional on its face. We reject this argument and affirm his 
conviction and sentence"); United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 
1219 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We now join [other] courts in holding that S 841 
remains constitutionally enforceable notwithstanding Apprendi"); United 
States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 256 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We decline 
Appellants' invitation to find that 21 U.S.C. S 841 is unconstitutional in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi"). 
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Notably, the Supreme Court did not find the New Jersey 
statute at issue in Apprendi to be facially unconstitutional 
and unenforceable, but struck down only the procedure 
employed to increase petitioner's sentence. See Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 497 ("[t]he New Jersey procedure challenged in 
this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury 
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal 
justice system") (emphasis added). 
 
Accordingly, we reject the contention that S 841 is facially 
unconstitutional in light of Apprendi. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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